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TORTS
Dram Shop Law: Codify Third Party Liability
CODE SECTION: O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40 (amended)
BILL NUMBER: HB 1495
ACT NUMBER: 1419
SUMMARY: The Act establishes that servers of alco-
holic beverages shall be liable for the acts
of certain intoxicated persons.
EFFECTIVE DATE: April 12, 1988
History
At common law, an individual who provided alcoholic beverages to an-
other was not liable if that other person caused injury to himself or to a
third person after becoming intoxicated.' No cause of action existed be-
cause the consumption of alcohol, rather than its provision, was deemed
the proximate cause of any subsequent injury.2
Modern courts, however, have been willing to impose liability upon
commercial vendors who provide alcoholic beverages to individuals in cer-
tain circumstances.3 In the last twenty years, some courts have also been
willing to extend liability to social hosts who provide alcohol to guests
when these guests become intoxicated and cause harm to themselves or to
third parties."
Georgia case law establishes dram shop5 liability without relying on a
specific dram shop act by the legislature.' In Sutter v. Hutchings,7 the
Supreme Court of Georgia first imposed liability on a social host who pro-
vided alcohol to an obviously intoxicated minor. Since the host knew that
1. Note, Social Host Liability: Opening a Pandora's Box, 61 IND. L.J. 85 (1985)
[hereinafter Pandora's Box].
2. See Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. App. 2d 656, 307 P.2d 369 (1957); Mitchell v.
Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964); Pandora's Box, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Tibbs v. Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc., 184 Ga. App. 642, 362 S.E.2d
377 (1987) (liability imposed for providing alcohol to persons noticeably intoxicated).
4. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985); Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Altman, 183 Ga. App. 611, 359 S.E.2d 385 (1987).
5. A dram shop is "[a] drinking establishment where liquors are sold to be drunk in
the premises; a bar or saloon." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (5th ed. 1979).
6. A dram shop act "impose[s] liability on the seller of intoxicating liquors... when
a third party is injured as a result of the intoxication of the buyer where the sale has
caused or contributed to such intoxication. Some acts apply to gifts as well as sales."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 444 (5th ed. 1979).
7. 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985).
HeinOnline  -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 498 1988-1989
1
: TORTS Dram Shop Law:  Codify Third Party Liability
Published by Reading Room, 1988
LEGISLATIVE REVIEW
the teenager would soon be driving an automobile, the host was held lia-
ble for injury to a third party when the teenager later was involved in an
automobile accident. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the duty to
abstain from serving alcoholic beverages "to the driver who is noticeably
intoxicated" extends to social hosts as well as to commercial sellers.8
The court used the Georgia Code and previous court decisions to estab-
lish dram shop liability for social hosts in Georgia.9 The court specifically
noted the Code prohibition against providing alcoholic beverages to in-
toxicated persons.10 The court also quoted the Code provision establish-
ing that "[n]o person knowingly, by himself or through another, shall fur-
nish [or] cause to be furnished ... any alcoholic beverage to any person
under 19 years of age."'1 Further, the court, in a previous decision, stated
that a person owes a duty not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of
harm.12 Sutter extends this duty to alcohol-related cases based on the
court's finding of legislative intent.13
The question of proximate cause was more difficult for the Sutter court
to resolve. The court admitted that in many circumstances the act which
proximately causes damage to a third party is the consumption of alcohol.
Under such circumstances the consumer of the alcohol is solely liable be-
cause the act of providing alcohol is too remote to satisfy proximate cause
requirements.' However, the court held that injury to a third party is
foreseeable when alcohol is provided to a teenager who is obviously intox-
icated and who will soon be driving an automobile. 5
8. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 197, 327 S.E.2d 716, 719 (1985) (applying
O.C.G.A. §§ 3-3-22, -23 and 5-1-6 (1982)).
9. In Sutter, the court also relied on the decisions of courts from other jurisdictions,
especially New Jersey. In the New Jersey cases, the courts found liability for furnish-
ing alcohol to noticeably intoxicated persons when the furnisher knew that these per-
sons would soon drive an automobile. Sutter, 254 Ga. at 195, 327 S.E.2d at 717. Kelly
v. Ginnell, 96 N.J. 538, 547, 476 A.2d 1219, 1228 (1984); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super.
212, 215-16, 356 A.2d 15, 19 (1976).
10. Sutter, 254 Ga. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 719-20 (citing O.C.G.A. § 3-3-22 (1982)).
O.C.G.A. § 3-3-22 states: "No alcoholic beverage shall be sold ... given, provided, or
furnished to any person who is in a state of noticeable intoxication."
11. Sutter, 254 Ga. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 719-20 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 3-3-23 (1982)).
The legal drinking age is now twenty-one years of age. O.C.G.A. § 3-3-23 (Supp. 1988);
see 1986 Ga. Laws 789.
12. Sutter, 254 Ga. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 719-20 (referring to Bradley Center v.
Wessner, 250 Ga. 199, 201, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1982)).
13. Sutter, 254 Ga. at 197, 327 S.E.2d at 719-20. "[I]n view of risks involved and
the General Assembly's efforts to control drunk driving for the protection not only of
those drivers but others on the highways, we conclude that these statutory duties pro-
tect third parties as well as those noticeably intoxicated and under 19." Id. (quoting
O.C.G.A. §§ 3-3-22, -23 (1982)).
14. Id. at 197-98, 327 S.E.2d at 720.
15. Id. at 198, 327 S.E.2d at 719. The court noted that this holding was analogous to
its finding in Crisp v. Wright, 56 Ga. App. 338, 192 S.E. 390 (1937). In Crisp, the court
imposed liability upon the owner of an automobile who entrusted it to another person.
49919881
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In cases following Sutter, the Georgia Court of Appeals expanded dram
shop liability to providers of alcohol, to their employees, and to bars serv-
ing patrons when those who received the alcohol were obviously intoxi-
cated. In Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph v. Altman," the court
held a business host responsible for injury resulting from the consump-
tion of alcoholic beverages provided to an employee. 17 Similarly, in Tibbs
v. Studebaker's of Savannah, Inc., 8 the court found that a commercial
establishment is liable for third party injuries when it sells alcoholic bev-
erages to someone who is obviously intoxicated. 9 The Georgia Supreme
Court denied certiorari in these cases.20
HB 1495
HB 1495 was introduced to codify the Georgia dram shop liability deci-
sions.2 ' Critics of the original bill at first feared the measure would nar-
row the liability of persons, especially bar owners, who provide alcoholic
beverages to others. One critic, the Metropolitan Atlanta Council on Alco-
hol and Drugs, feared the bill would decrease the liability of providers of
intoxicating beverages for injuries to third parties."'
The first section of the bill contained the common law definition of
proximate cause for injuries resulting from intoxication. The original bill
stated, "The General Assembly finds and declares that the consumption
of alcoholic beverages, rather than the sale or furnishing or serving of
such beverages, is the proximate cause of any injury, including death and
property damage, inflicted by an intoxicated person upon himself or upon
16. 183 Ga. App. 611, 359 S.E.2d 385 (1987).
17. However, the court found that Southern Bell had satisfied its duty to third par-
ties by its exercise of reasonable care. The intoxicated employee was driven home by a
coworker under the employer's direction. The intoxicated employee subsequently,
while still intoxicated, drove his car and caused an accident in which he was killed. Id.
at 612, 359 S.E.2d at 386.
18. 184 Ga. App. 642, 362 S.E.2d 377 (1987).
19. In Tibbs, the court relied on Southern Bell, to affirm that "one who provides
alcoholic beverages to a noticeably intoxicated person, knowing that the person will
soon be driving a vehicle may be liable for a third party's injuries caused by the negli-
gence of the intoxicated driver." 184 Ga. App. at 643, 362 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting
Southern Bell's approval of the Sutter holding).
20. See Fulton County Daily Rep., Feb. 4, 1988, at 4, col. 3.
21. Representative Thomas Chambless, House District No. 133, stated on the floor
of the House, "It's not revolutionary. It's a simple effort to codify the law as it pres-
ently exists." Fulton County Daily Rep., Feb. 4, 1988, at 1, col. 1.
22. Id. at col. 3. Representative Thomas Chambless stated that it was his opinion
that the bill as originally written would not relieve anyone of liability. Representative
Chambless affirmed that his purpose in introducing the bill was to codify decisions by
the Georgia courts which established dram shop liability. Telephone interview with
Representative Thomas Chambless, House District No. 133 (Mar. 11, 1988) [hereinaf-
ter Chambless Interview].
[Vol. 5:498
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another person. '23 Although dram shop liability establishes that the prox-
imate cause of injury is both the provision and consumption of alcoholic
beverages, this provision in the original bill could have eliminated the lia-
bility of liquor providers in Georgia.2 4
The original bill further provided two specific areas in which a person
is liable for furnishing alcoholic beverages to another person who later
causes injury to himself or to a third party. If intoxicating beverages are
provided to an underage person who is about to drive a vehicle or if in-
toxicating beverages are provided to a person who is obviously intoxicated
and is about to drive a vehicle, liability attaches to the provider.25
The original bill posed a problem for enforcement and interpretation.
The first section of the original bill established that the consumption and
not the serving of intoxicating beverages was the proximate cause of in-
jury.26 This was arguably inapposite to later sections of the bill, which
established liability for providers of alcoholic beverages under certain
circumstances.2
7
The Senate amended the bill in order to avoid possible ambiguities be-
tween these sections of the bill. 28 The amendment established that if al-
coholic beverages are served to a person under the legal drinking age who
will soon drive a vehicle and who later has an accident, the provider may
be liable for any injuries caused to third persons.29 Further, anyone pro-
23. HB 1495, as introduced, 1988 Ga. Gen. Assem. If the person selling or providing
alcoholic beverages was furnished with proper identification (as defined in O.C.G.A. §
3-3-23(d) (Supp. 1988)) by the consumer and that identification was relied upon by
the seller or provider, there is an irrebuttable presumption that the alcoholic beverages
were not sold, furnished, or served willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully. H.B. 1495, as
introduced, 1988 Ga. Gen. Assem.
24. HB 1495, as introduced, 1988 Ga. Gen. Assem. These provisions in the original
bill might have been in conflict with the provision in section one, defining proximate
cause. If the consuming, rather than the providing, of alcoholic beverages is the proxi-
mate cause of injury, the provider of intoxicating beverages may be totally exempt
from liability. The original bill raised ambiguities which would make the law unclear.
25. HB 1495, as introduced, 1988 Ga. Gen. Assem. These two provisions survived
unchanged. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) (Supp. 1988). The Act exempts persons who own,
lease, or otherwise lawfully occupy a premise, unless that premise is licensed for the
sale of alcoholic beverages from liability for the actions of any person who consumes
alcoholic beverages on that property without the consent of the owner, lessee, or lawful
occupant. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(d) (Supp. 1988). The Act also exempts the provider or
seller of the alcohol from liability to the consumer for injuries sustained because of
consumption of that alcohol. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) (Supp. 1988).
26. HB 1495, as introduced, 1988 Ga. Gen. Assem.
27. Id.
28. According to Representative Chambless, the bill was amended to avoid the pos-
sibility that the law would eliminate dram shop liability in certain circumstances be-
cause of the definition of proximate cause in the original bill. Representative Chain-
bless does not think that the amended language was necessary, but he did not oppose
it. Chambless Interview, supra note 22. See O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(a) (Supp. 1988).
29. The Act provides:
[A] person who willfully, knowingly, and unlawfully sells, furnishes, or
1988]
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viding alcoholic beverages to a person who is noticeably intoxicated and
who will soon be driving a vehicle also may be liable for third party inju-
ries.30 To avoid possible ambiguities, the Senate amendment was adopted
by the conference committee; other differences in the two versions were
resolved, and the Conference Committee Report passed both houses. 1
J. Voyles
serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is not of lawful drinking age,
knowing that such person will soon be driving a motor vehicle, or who
knowingly sells, furnishes, or serves alcoholic beverages to a person who is
in a state of noticeable intoxication, knowing that such person will soon be
driving a motor vehicle, may become liable for injury or damage caused by
or resulting from the intoxication of such minor or person when the sale,
furnishing, or serving is the proximate cause of such injury or damage.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) (Supp. 1988).
HB 1123, also passed this session, amends O.C.G.A. § 51-1-18 to allow the custodial
parent or parents to bring a cause of action against persons who "sell or furnish alco-
holic beverages" to their underage child without their permission. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-
18(a) (Supp. 1988).
30. O.C.G.A. § 51-1-40(b) (Supp. 1988).
31. Chambless Interview, supra note 22.
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